Erasing the Past to Protect a Fairytale

396  Betsy Wolf interview with CIA officer William Larson



Related:
80  Volume 5 of Office of Security-file on Oswald

What makes [Malcolm Blunt's] his case even more unusual is the fact that he lives in the United Kingdom. But he travels to Washington and does valuable work sorting through the Kennedy archives at NARA. It is through his work, and his work only, that we discovered a key figure who would have otherwise remained anonymous. Her name is Betsy Wolf.

Betsy Wolf was one of the researchers for the House Select Committee on Assassinations. She interacted with attorneys Michael Goldsmith and Dan Hardway on matters related to the CIA. On page 514 of the HSCA report, she is listed as a researcher under the name Elizabeth Wolf, but she signed all of her work with the first name of Betsy. (…)


Oswald in Minsk, Belarus

Wolf approached her assignment as if no one had ever done any research on the subject [Oswald's security files ] before. Considering how little the Warren Commission delved into the area, this was largely true. She investigated and asked for the charters of different directorates and divisions within the CIA (e.g. Soviet Russia, Office of Security, CI/SIG). A paradox that stymied her was the following: a rule that had been followed informally was that a 201 file should be opened whenever a subject accumulates at least five documents. (Michael Goldsmith interview with CIA officer William Larson, 6/27/78). This made an impression on Wolf because Larson was the Chief of the Information Management Staff. Larson also said that the Office of Security did not open 201 files. (ibid) Yet, this is where the early documents on Oswald went.

Why was this important information? Because prior to the 201 file on Oswald being opened, there were twelve items in the Oswald file. (Blind Memo of HSCA Team Five) Wolf found this so odd that she wrote it down three times in her notes and also listed the items. Four of the documents—from the Navy and State Department— had been sent to CIA within a week or so of the defection. Both Navy and State knew about Oswald’s threat to give secrets to the Soviets. And this information was in the cables. (ibid) According to three witnesses that Wolf interviewed, Larson, CI/SIG chief Birch O’Neil (sometimes spelled O’Neal), and CIA Director Dick Helms, that information should have caused the opening of a 201 file. (…)


In addition to Larson saying that OS did not open 201 files, he said something else that was rather mystifying, that OS worked closely with the Counter-Intelligence division (CI). And CI could cause the opening of a 201 file. (Op. Cit. Larson interview) What could be a more compelling reason for the counter-intelligence office opening a file on Oswald than his threatening to give secrets of the U-2 to the Soviets? (ibid, pp. 45, 48) But again, it did not occur. Larson also said that if he had been in his position in 1959, he would have sent Oswald’s files to the Soviet Russia (SR) division. (ibid, p. 56) Larson said that for such a lacuna to happen, SR must not have been aware of the State Department memo. (ibid, p. 74) Larson also stated that project files are held separately from the 201 file. But if the subject is part of an operation, that operation number should be on the 201 file. As we shall see, there was no such number on the first document once the Oswald file was opened.

Larson’s interview was apparently too revealing. Malcolm Blunt first discovered it in 2006. But in his visits to NARA in 2010 and 2017, he couldn’t find it.

(Vasilios Vazakas, Jim DiEugenio, Creating the Oswald Legend – Part 4)