Erasing the Past to Protect a Fairytale

147  Frazier's phantom polygraph



He was then brought in and questioned, asked to sign a confession, held in custody for a total of almost
10 hours, and given a lie detector test, to which we still don’t have the results of, only the police’s word
that he passed it. So ask yourself, why do we not have those results? If he passed it, what’s the big deal?

(...)

One final suspicious event revolves around Wesley Buell Frazier, the only Oswald acquaintance who was
arrested in Dallas on November 22, and how chief polygraph examiner Paul Bentley claimed to know nothing
about him. Bentley was the man at the Texas Theatre arrest scene who lied about taking Oswald’s wallet
from his back pocket. Frazier sometimes gave Oswald a ride to or from work, and drove him to work that
morning. Frazier was the only man to claim that Oswald had carried “curtain rods” in a bag to the Texas
School Book Depository. Frazier owned a British Enfield 303, a rifle mysteriously identified by NBC as the
murder weapon on November 22 before the story settled around the Mannlicher-Carcano. At about 6:45
pm, Frazier was arrested and picked up for questioning by the Dallas police. Was Frazier being set up as
a possible patsy? One pristine Enfield 303 bullet on a stretcher would have done the job.


Frazier was taken into custody right after Oswald had vehemently denied Frazier’s curtain rod story during
interrogation. Oswald said the only package he carried to work was his bag lunch, containing cheese,
bread, fruit and apples. An FBI report shows that Frazier was given a polygraph at about midnight by R.D.
Lewis, the other examiner for the police department, and was then released. We do know that Frazier
stated that he did not think that the paper bag found by the police was what Oswald used to carry his
curtain rods. As Frazier and his sister were the only ones who ever saw Oswald carrying any kind of brown
paper package, and as Frazier by far had the best look, the handmade paper bag “found” at the book
depository could not be used as evidence. Several members of the Dallas police methodically lied about
knowing about the “phantom polygraph” even though it was a matter of public record.


A voice stress analysis conducted by George O’Toole, a former chief of the CIA’s Problems Analysis Branch,
showed chief polygraph examiner Paul Bentley lying about not knowing that Frazier was polygraphed. Even
if you don’t accept voice stress analysis, it’s impossible to believe that Bentley would forget such a
significant incident. Why would Bentley lie about this polygraph, even when someone else actually
conducted it? The man who conducted the polygraph, R. D. Lewis, claimed he couldn’t remember it either.
As stated in the FBI report, “the Dallas Police Department (was) of the opinion the brown, heavy paper
was used by Oswald to carry the rifle into the building where he was working.” The results of Frazier’s
polygraph killed that theory. Bentley wanted to see Oswald go down. As mentioned in Chapter 6, even FBI
agent Barrett has now labeled Bentley as a liar.

(Bill Simpich, State secret)

149  One FBI 17-11-1963 Teletype



Q: Mr. Walter, of course your name has popped up on terms of the, concerning the investigation of the Kennedy
assassination and indications that the FBI night have known before hand that there night have been an
assassination attempt and it all centers around a teletype statement or a memo of some sort. Can you tell us
what this is all about, sir, and what you got when you worked for the PEI?

Walter: Well, what was received by the New Orleans FBI Office on the 17th of November of 1963 was a normal
movement teletype that the FBI offices throughout the country would receive if a dignitary or the President
would cone into your area and they were primarily concerned with developing information as to if there were any
demonstrations planned or any embarrassing situations that the President or dignitary nay be placed in and this
particular teletype was sent from Washington to all the SACs in the offices and I happened to be working the
night from 12 midnight to 8 in the morning the night that it cane in, indicating that they, the FBI, had received
information that a possible attempt would be cads on President Kennedy's life in Dallas on the Dallas trip.


Q: Well, the FBI here is is denying any sort of knowledge of that Reno or any kind of teletype message whatsoever.
Are they just mistaken, or lying or covering mp, or what?

Walter: Well, that, you know that's, well, I guess that's for the public to decide. I'm willing to go to a Grand Jury or a
Senate investigative hearing and give and give the evidence that I have and also name names and I think possibly the
Bureau has always taken the position, and I don't have anything against the Bureau. I worked there for five and a half
years. Zr, the Bureau's always taken the position of don't embarrass the Bureau and they felt at this time that this
information couldn't couldn't have been handled in a more professional canner and wouldn't have had any sr. effect at
all on who would assassinate Kennedy.or of the outcome of the assassination.

(...)

Q: Did you put that, that teletype in the file when you received it?

Walter: No, my, my procedure was to call the Special Agent in Charge, then call the Agents, er, that would deal with
those kind of cases and then mark that notation on the file and put it on the Special Agent is Charge's desk. See, this
was, this came in at 1:47 a.m. Central Standard Tine, en, on the 17th of November, 1963.


Interviewer: And it apparently disappeared from that point on?

Walter: Well that was in the file at one stage and then of course after the assassination if, er,
a group of, er, employees at the office, we were concerned primarily over whether or not, er, anybody in the New Orleans
Office would, would be criticized for handling of that teletype or whether or not that teletype had produced any, er,
positive information as to anything that was gonna happen in Dallas and so a couple of us, who had talked about it, were
concerned about who was gonna get in trouble and if anybody was gonna get is trouble and we want back to locate the
teletype and we were able to locate it about three days after the assassination but after that we didn't see it any more.
And we looked.

(From TRANSCRIPT OP TAPED INTERVIEW OF WILLIAM S. WALTER, MORNING OF OCTOBER 1, 1975 BY WGSO RADIO, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA)

The Teletype message as remembered by William S. Walter:


The committee also examined a claim by Walter that he saw a teletype on November 17,
1963, sent by FBI headquarters, warning that there would be an assassination attempt against
President Kennedy. Walter claimed the teletype had vanished a few days later, when he
tried to locate it after the shooting in Dallas. Walter's prime witness, whom he believed could
corroborate his story, has stated that she recalls nothing about it. Based on this, the Select
Committee concluded that Walter was not a credible witness. Based on several contacts with
Walter, the author concurs.

(Henry Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, footnote on p. 306)




Vincent Michael Palamara is one of the most respected JFK assassination researchers. In his excellent, eye-
opening book Survivor’s Guilt: The Secret Service and the Failure to Protect President Kennedy (2013), he
expresses no doubt that William S. Walter “received a memo via telex warning of a plot to kill JFK [by] ‘a militant
revolutionary group [which] may attempt to assassinate President Kennedy on his proposed trip to Dallas…’”
Palamara has come across an obscure official Secret Service document, dated only two days before the Walter
telex, and published by the Warren Commission in 1964, which seems to substantiate Walter’s testimony about
the telex. The document states on its face that it is based on “information received telephonically from FBI
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.” It also says that the FBI acquired its information from an individual “interviewed
by the FBI on November 14, 1963…” On page 65 of his book Palamara writes: “Some have tried to discredit the
authenticity of this telex, but a document ignored by the Warren Commission, and since discovered by the author,
appears to corroborate it. Originating from the San Antonio, Texas field office [of the Secret Service] and dated
11/15/63, here is the pertinent part of the text: ‘… a militant group of the National States Rights Party plans to
assassinate the President and other high-level officials.” (For anyone interested in crosschecking, a photocopy
of the Secret Service document Palamara refers to is on page 566 of volume 17 of the Hearings Before the
President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.)

(Donald E. Wilkes Jr., Did J. Edgar Hoover Kill JFK?, 12-27-2017)

151   Notes and files of Arlen Specter's predecessor in the Warren Commission



[Barry Ernest] also tried to get in contact with Francis Adams, one of the Warren Commission senior counsel.
Adams worked for about a month and then left. His duties were assumed totally by Arlen Specter. It was
never clear as to why. And when Lee Rankin, the Commission executive director, was asked about Adams, he
replied he should have fired him the first day. (p. 171) Further, there was nothing left behind to explain
exactly why he left. Nothing until a quote about leaving showed up in 1966 that said that he was too busy
at his law firm and that he had a “different concept of the investigation.” (p. 172) There was no reply to any
of Barry’s queries to Adams. But when he died, Barry wrote his surviving wife. He got a call back form his
daughter Joyce Adams. She first wanted to know if Barry had spoken to ‘Specter.’ She said the name like the
late Jean Hill would intone it. Barry said he had not. Joyce laughed when she heard about the “too busy at
the law firm” excuse. He would have never joined up if that were the case. She thought the real reasons was
he did not like the way they were proceeding, “If he didn’t think it was being run properly, he would be the
type to leave.” (p. 173)


Francis William Holbrooke Adams (June 26, 1904 – April 20, 1990) was an American
lawyer who served as an assistant counsel to the 1963–64 Warren Commission.

Barry then asked if her father had many any notes, or writings or kept personal papers from his days with the
Commission. Joyce quietly said that he had. They were kept in longhand. Barry asked to review the file. Joyce
said this was in her sister Judith’s possession. She said she had to talk to her sister first and would get back
to him after. She never did. It is unfortunate that this information was not turned over to the ARRB, for
whatever was in those files would have been very important to discover.

(Joseph E. Green & Jim DiEugenio, review of The Girl on the Stairs)


Arlen Specter, would become the architect of the single bullet theory

153    Over 39,000 files from James Angleton's secret collection



See also:
22 Oswald's pre-Dec 1960 CIA-File
29 The missing section from the Lopez Report
80 Volume 5 of Office of Security-file on Oswald


George T. Kalaris, Angleton's successor, instigated an investigation into Angleton's filing system.

His team found "entire sets of vaults and sealed rooms scattered all around the second and third floors of
CIA headquarters". They came across over 40 safes, some of them had not been opened for over ten
years. No one on Angleton's remaining staff knew what was in them and no one had the combinations
anymore. Kalaris was forced to call in a "crack team of safebusters to drill open the door".


George Kalaris                                  James Angleton

The investigators found "Angleton's own most super-sensitive files, memoranda, notes and letters... tapes,
photographs" and according to Kalaris "bizarre things of which I shall never ever speak".

The investigators also found documents concerning Lee Harvey Oswald and on 18th September, 1975, George
T. Kalaris wrote a memo to the executive assistant to the deputy director of Operations of the CIA describing
the contents of Oswald's 201 file. "There is also a memorandum dated 16 October 1963 from (redacted but
likely Winston Scott) to the United States Ambassador there concerning Oswald's visit to Mexico City and to
the Soviet Embassy there in late September - early October 1963. Subsequently there were several Mexico
City cables in October 1963 also concerned with Oswald's visit to Mexico City, as well as his visits to the
Soviet and Cuban Embassies."

John Newman, the author of Oswald and the CIA (2008) has pointed out: "the significance of the Kalaris
memo is that it disclosed the existence of pre-assassination knowledge of Oswald's activities in the Cuban
Consulate, and that this had been put into cables in October 1963."

"Angleton had been quietly building an alternative CIA, subscribing only to his rules, beyond peer review or
executive supervision."

Over the next three years "a team of highly trained specialists another three full years just to sort, classify,
file, and log the material into the CIA system."

CIA Officer Leonard McCoy was given the responsibility of inspected the most important files. McCoy was
advised "to retain less than one half of 1 per cent of the total, or no more than 150-200 out of the 40,000.”

The rest of Angleton's files were then destroyed.

(Spartacus Educational)


CIA's man in the Sixth Floor Museum 
Charles Briggs 

Gary Mack and I had a “private” conversation about Charles’ status. Charles Briggs had more knowledge of
more secrets in the CIA than probably anyone other than Angleton (and it appears he was the keeper of
Angleton’s files as well, moving about 15% of the 400 yards of files into the main CIA database and overseeing
the destruction of the rest).

(Chris Newton)